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STRhTTOl~

I

Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Timothy Leonard Wood, appeals from
Hrnunary judgment entered in the Fifth Judicial District
Court, State of Utah, in favor of Respondents and dismissing Appellant's Complaint.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant filed his Complaint and alleged an action
in wrongful death.

Respondents answered and raised the

dr'iC'nsc of the Utah Guest Statute.
fiv~

depositions were taken.

Discovery proceeded and

On the 25th day of May, 1983,

Respondents filed a Motion for Sununary Judgment asking
Court to dismiss Appellant's Complaint.

th,

Respondents did

not support their motion with affidavits, but simultaneous;
with the filing of the Motion for Sununary Judgment filed
Motion to Publish Depositions.

Appellant did not file

opposing affidavits, but did file Abstracts of Deoositi%c;
in Opposition to the Motion for Sununary Judgment.
The Court entered sununary judgment in favor of
Respondents and dismissed Appellant's Complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks reversal of the summary judoment and seeks to have the case remanded for further proc,2c;ings.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Inasmuch as this appeal is taken from summary
ruling in the lower court, no transcript of testimony is
available and this statement of facts is supported only

~

reference to documents in the Court file and depositions
relied upon by both parties.
Appellant's minor son sustained personal injuries
resulting in death in a one automobile accident which
occurred on the 23rd day of April, 1982.
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(Ruesch depo ,

f>.

77, 1. 5-12).

Respondent, Winston Stratton, was the

'"·'·i:r·r of the automobile involved

(Memorandum of Points and

Auth<>rities filed by Respondents on the 26th day of June,
l~R3)

and his minor son, Tracy Stratton, was the driver of

said automobile.

(Gubler depo., p. 40, 1. 6-8; Answer to

cr,rnr·l aint).

Seven persons occupied the vehicle, one of which
the deceased,

~a>

Timothy Johnathan Wood.

front and four in the

bac~.

Three in the

Dawnette Gubler was sitting

nn the console between the driver's seat and the passenger's
seat

in

the front.

(Gubler depo., p. 30-31).

The accident occured on a curve in an asphalt
covered road.
Jir~ctinn

5 4) .

The vehicle was traveling in a southerly

in the right lane.

(Gubler depo., p. 41, 1. 53-

In the middle of the curve is a depression in the

asphalt roadway.

The depression is 2li - 3li feet deep in

the left lane of said road.

(Gubler depo., o. 53, 1. 2-13)

Respondent, Tracy Stratton, was familiar with said
road ilnd dip.

(Ha depo., p. 21, 1. 11-25; p. 22, 1. 1-3;

Gla2ier depo., p. 9, 1. 1-14; p. 9, 1. 24-25; p. 10, 1. 1-4;
1•.

10, 1. 11-17; p. 11, 1. 1-11; p. 14, 1. 7-11).
On the day of the accident and at the time of the
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same, Respondent was driving a Ford Bronco at an est 1111 at 1
speed of 60 - 65 miles per hour

(Gubler depo., p.

14-22) and the speed limit was 40 miles per hour

67,

!.

(Gubltr

depo., p. 42, 1. 17-23).
The speed at which said Respondent was operillH:
said vehicle was such,

as the vehicle entered the curve,

that the passenger, Gail Ann Ruesch, exclaimed,
let me out.

Let me out."

(Ruesch depo.,

p.

"Stor'•

24,

1.

lG-1!1.

Immediately prior to enterina said depression in the rc0!·
way, the vehicle was being driven on the right side: c,f

ti,

road and then swerved over to the left side and hit the
depression at an angle.

(Gubler depo.,

p.

47,

1.

12-1'7).

The driver, Tracy Stratton, turned the vehicle into the
lef~

lane of traffic while negotiating the curve.

depo., p. 51, 1. 8-25).
Gubler that the driver,

It is the testimony of
Respondent,

(Gubl

Dawnettr~

switched lanes to

~c•

a better angle on the depression to fascilitate greater

lift of the vehicle.
52, 1. 1-2).

(Gublerdepo., p.

47,

1.

The Bronco then became airborne.

12-17;p.
(Gubler

depo., p. 58, 1. 9-17).
After leaving the depression the vehicle tra'.'cc'
the length of a football field.
23-24).

(Gubler depo., p. 67, l

The vehicle was swerving from side to side Jn!
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anJ rolled several times.

(Gubler depo., p. 43, 1. 7-20).

There is some evidence that the young men involved,
including the driver, intended to frighten the girls and made
plans to do so shortly prior to entering the Bronco vehicle
fur the drive which resulted in the injuries and death
(Ha depo., p. 16, 1. 17-25; p. 17, 1. 1-8).
Tl1ot the drive was

intended by the boys to frighten the girls

is further supported by the testimony of one of the female
11assenacrs, Gail Ann Ruesch.

(Ruesch depo., p. 36, 1. 2-9).

l\RGUMENT
POINT
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPOND
ENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WHERE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT EXIST.
Respondents did not support their Motion for Summary
lticLimcnt ,,•ith affidavits and did submit a memorandum in
suuuurt of the motion and relied upon the depositions of
four nf the surviving occupants to support their position
lhdl the Complaint should be dismissed.

Respondents also

subniitlcd the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to local
1ule 2.S and at no time prior to entry of summary judgment
Ju•

sled a hearing on the motion.
Appellant relied upon the depositions to oppose
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the motion.
Rule 56 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
states in part,
when a motion for summary judqment
is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.
If he does
not so respond, summary judgment,
if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.
(emphasis added).
Respondents did not support their Motion for
Summary Judgment with affidavits.

Respondents re 1 ied upon

the cepositions of witnesses to support their motion.

A

reading of those depositions indicates that there is sufficient evidence for reasonable minds to conclude that
Respondent, Tracy Stratton, engaged in willful misconduct
which was a proximate cause of the death of Timothy
Johnathan Wood.
Rule 56 (e), provides that if a Motion for Summan
Judgment is supported as provided for by said rule, and if
the other parties fail to respond and raise issues of
material fact, the Court shall, if appropriate, enter
summary judgment against the nonresponding party.
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The Respondents, having failed to support their
i'lt'l

ion for Surrunary Judgment with affidavits and having

relied upon depositions of witnesses, which will be called
by Aopellant,

summary judgment for Respondents is not

u1)uruprj ate.

Those depositions contained testimony and

,v1dence which could allow reasonable minds to conclude
ll1C1t Resoondent, Tracy Stratton, engaged in willful misconduct.

As a result of Respondents failing to support
treir motion with affidavits and indicating their intention

to rely upon said depositions, Appellant could reasonably
rely upon those depositions to oopose the surrunary judgment
that had been submitted by Respondents.
If the deoositions contain testimony which is
';c1fficient to raise material issues of fact, the surrunary
iu~~mcnt

granted to Resoondents is inappropriate.
Respondents relied upon the standard of "Willful

Misconduct" as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Stack
'~·_Ke~r:I'~~·

Utah, 221 P.2d 594

(1950), at page 597, which

is as follows:
The intentional doing of an act or
intentional failing to do an act, with
knowledge that serious injury is a probable and not merely possible result, or
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the intentional doing of an act with
wanton and reckless disregard of the
possible consequences.
It involves
deliberate, intentional or wanton
conduct in doing or omitting to do
an act with knowledge or appreciation
that injury is likely to result therefrom.
Appellant agrees with the standard set forth
the Stack case.

iri

In that case, at the close of the trio\,

the jury rendered a verdict of "no cause of action" agillr,':
the plaintiff.

Thereafter, the trial court granted the

plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.

At the second trial

the jury verdict was in favor of plaintiff.
The SupreMe Court concluded that the evidence
sufficient that " ... the jury might well infer that the
defendant was driving much to fast for existing condition'
and further found that the jury had acted properly and
sufficient evidence was before the same to conclude that
defendant had engaged in willful misconduct.
The fcicts in the Stack case were that the defer.:•
driver had three (3) other persons in his vehicle initi1ll·
and started up fast.

A passenger remarked "take it easy"

and the defendant slowed the vehicle down.

Later in the

journey defendant was driving "pretty fast" as the car
over a dip, it seemed that defendant temporarily lost
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W'
C·"·

of the car.

Plaintiff noticed that a female passenger was

friohtened and requested that defendant slow down.
col owed the vehicle.

Defendant

After discharging a female passenger

tl1e defendant drove at a moderate speed and then began to
rick

ur

speed as he approached a curve and he accelerated

and braked the car at the same time as the car started
The car skidded around the curve and
lc>ft the oiled surface.

No accident resulted.

mGle passenger asked defendant to slow down.

Again a
Defendant

lauo)1c'l it off and increased his soeed as approaching another
cCJn'c.

.l\s defendant entered the second curve he again

l>rak0d and accelerated at the same time, the car swerved
sideways around the curve, went out of control, swerved to
the other side of the road, skidded, hit the bridge abutment and turned over.
The facts in the instant case are similar if not
mere eqreqious.

Within a week prior to the accident,

respondent, Tracy Stratton, had driven said road and negotiated said depression.
Seven persons were in the automobile at the time
of the accident, three in the front seat and four in the
(Gubler depo., p. 30-31).
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Dawnette Gubler was

sitting on the console between the driver's seat and
passenger seat in the front.

u,~

(A seating arrangement whicr

is prohibited by section 41-6-108, U.C.A.,

(1953, as amende·,

The driver was exceeding the speed limit by some 20 - 25
miles per hour.
let her out.

One female asked the driver to stop and

In the curve and just before the depression

in the road, the driver turned the vehicle into the opposit;
lane of traffic, passed through the depression and the vehk'
became airborne.

The driver then lost control and the

vehicle rolled several times resulting in the death of
Timothy Johnathan Wood and Diane Gubler.
The standard of willful misconduct is set forth
in th<0 Stack case in the alternative.

The second al ternat>.

definition is" ... the intentional doing of an act with
wanton and reckless disregard of the possible consequences.

p. 597.
The intentional acts of the driver, Tracy Stratu·
were as follows:
1.

Improper loading the vehicle with passengers.

2.

Driving on a known curved and dangerous ro~

in excess of a posted speed limit.
3.

Switching lanes in a curve.

There is a fourth point which is implicit in U"
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testimony of the witnesses and that is the driver acceler0ted and switched lanes intentionally to hit the depression
0t such an angle as to give his vehicle the greatest lift
possible in an attempt to make the vehicle airborne.

In

other words, the actions of the driver were intended by the
driver to cause him to become airborne, i.e. loose control
of the vehicle.
Even if the evidence cited from the depositions
is disputed, there is sufficient evidence therein, that
reasonable minds could conclude that the driver engaged in
~illful

misconduct resulting in death.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED PROCEDURELY IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
RESPONDENTS.
Respondents filed their Motion for Summary Judgment
nn the 26th day of May, 1983, toqether with their Memorandum
in Support thereof.

The motion was submitted under Rule

2.8 and without affidavits.
Respondents' motion was not noticed for hearing by
e1ther counsel.

On the 7th day of June, 1983, the Court

,·aJled the matter before the Court.
and the matter was passed.

No counsel was present

On the 8th day of June, 1983,
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the court again called the matter and with no counsel beii,,
present a minute entry was made stating, "Court to

rev 1 ~w

and rule."
Prior to the Court ruling thereon, and on the
14th day of June, 1983, in opposition to Respondents' Motir.
for Summary Judgment, Appellant filed an Abstract of
Deposition.
for Hearing.

On the fol lowing day Appellant filed a Requect
On the 16th day of June, 1983, Appellant

two more Abstracts of Depositions in opposition.

fil~

Also on

the 16th day of June, 1983, the Court entered summary
judgment on behalf of Respondents.
Appellant being unaware that summary j ucJgment hai
been entered against him, continued to file documents
relating to his opposition to Respondents' motion and
filed said documents on the 17th day of June, the 21st da'/
of June, and the 22nd day of June, 1983.
The Appellant gives the above recitation to
indicate that the file has sufficient documentation therei'

1

to establish issues of material fact.
Five depositions have been taken in this case.
The deposition of Tracy Stratton was scheduled for June
27, 1983, and had been arranged with the Court Reporter
since the last week in April.
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The deposition of Winstori

Stratton is yet to be taken and other discovery may be
ncc0ssary.

The case is not at issue and sununary judgment

is premature and inappropriate.
When a moving party relies solely upon the
depositions of witnesses to support a Motion for Sununary
:flldciment and the depositions themselves contain testimony
and 0vidcnce sufficient to raise issues of fact, the
rnovinq parties are not entitled to sununary judgment and
summary judgment is not appropriate as contemplated by
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

POINT III
THE PARENT, AUTOMOBILE OWNER, HEREIN
IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 41-2-22 UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED (1953,, AS AMENDED).
The Respondents' Answer and Memorandum admits
that Winston Stratton is the father of Tracy Stratton and
the owner of the automobile in question.
~s~_l_und,

(Utah)

In Strange v.

594 P.2d 881, the Utah Supreme

Court held that Section 41-2-22 does apply in a situation
where the willful misconduct of the minor driver is in
issue.

As indicated by the Strange case, a parent can be

fc•unrl 1 iable for the willful misconduct of the minor
rl1ivcr.

Respondents rely on Eckols vs. Anderson, 27 U 2d
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74, 493 P.2d 304 to support it's proposition that w1 llfuJ
misconduct of a minor driver is not sufficient to imposro
liability upon the owner.

The Eckols opinion was rendered

in 1972, whereas the Strange vs. Ostlund opinion was
rendered in 1979.

The Utah Supreme Court discusses the

Eckols opinion in the Strange case and distinguishes the
same.
The files and records herein contain sufficient
admissions by Respondent, Winston Stratton, to establish
that he is the father of Tracy Stratton and the owner of
the automobile in question.
Section 41-2-22, U.C.A.

(1953, as amended) proviicc

for parental liability under the facts admitted to by
Respondent, Winston Stratton, in the event it is found that
his son, Tracy Stratton, committed wilful misconduct.

SUMMARY
At the time the District Court entered summary
judgment for Respondents, they had submitted only a memorandum and depositions of four witnesses to support their
motion.

Those depositions contain testimony of witnesses

sufficient to allow the trier of fact to reasonably concl
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tl,ctt Respondent, Tracy Stratton, while operating a motor
vehicle, intentionally engaged in acts or intentionally
fdiled to act, with knowledge that serious injury was the
probable and not merely a possible result of his actions.
Further, the testimony from those depositions is sufficient
to raise material issues of fact as to whether or not
Tracy Stratton intentionally acted with wanton and reckless misconduct of the possible consequences.

Also

reasonable persons could conclude that Tracy Stratton,
while driving the vehicle, engaged in activities deliberately,
intentionally and with wanton conduct with knowledge or
appreciation that injuries were likely to result therefrom.
Rule 56(e) contemplates that the Court, when
considering a Motion for Su!T\1'1ary Judgment, will review
the documents submitted by the moving parties and will
grant summary judgment only if said documents support that
party's position.

When a party moves for summary judgment

and supports the same with depositions that contain
testimony that will defeat the motion, it is inappropriate
for the Court to grant summary judgment.

The depositions

submitted by respondents were replete with testimony of
th~

willful misconduct of the minor driver.
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The Court erred in granting sununary judqment
when one Abstract of Deposition was filed two days prior
to the Court having ruled on the Respondents' motion and
when a Request for Hearing was filed one day prior to the
ruling.
In a wrongful death action extensive discovery
is usually in order.

With discovery having not been

complete at the time the Court entered sununary judgment,
said ruling was inappropriate.
The parent, automobile owner, is not entitled to
sununary judgment when testimony was before the Court,
which was sufficient to raise material issues of fact
regarding the willful misconduct of the minor driver.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing agruments, Appellant
respectfully submits that the sununary judgment should be
reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

-~\;

~~--- \,[,
iffi R. Scarth
Attorney for Appellant
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